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REDUCING MALAPPORTIONMENT IN JAPAN'S
ELECTORAL DISTRICTS:
THE SUPREME COURT MUST ACT
William Somers Baileyt
Abstract: Japan's Constitution does not expressly mandate periodic census and
reapportionment of electoral districts. The Election Law only suggests reapportionment.
Consequently, rapid population shifts in postwar Japan created endemic voter
imbalances. The Japanese Supreme Court has made some attempts to prod the national
parliament to take ameliorative action, but the result has always been "too little, too late."
Nevertheless, the evidence shows that the parliament does heed the Court's decisions.
This Comment urges the Court to tighten the three to one ratio it has developed for
allowable voter imbalances to two to one or better, and to abandon doctrines like the
"reasonable period" that postpone declarations of unconstitutionality and subsequent
legislative action.
I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 8, 1995, a five-justice panel of the Supreme Court of Japan
dismissed the equal protection claims of voters from eight prefectures.' The
voters asserted that it took nearly three votes in the worst-represented
district to have a voice in the Diet equal to only one vote in the bestrepresented district in the July 1993 House of Representatives election.2
This, they claimed, violated the guarantee of equality under article 14 of the
Japanese Constitution.3 In affirming the decisions of the High Courts the
Supreme Court stated: "The inequality at the time of the election was

t A.B., Far Eastern Languages (Harvard College), A.M., East Asian Studies. (Harvard University),
M.B.A (Stanford University).
Kasuga v. Tokyo Election Commission, 1538 HANREI JIH6 185, 185-86 (Sup. Ct., P.B., June 8,
1995). There were 26 suits by voters in 21 electoral districts in Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, and five prefectures.
Id at 185. Japan is split into 47 major administrative subdivisions. Generally, all are referred to herein as
prefectures, the usual translation of ken, but for historical reasons, Hokkaido is called d6, Tokyo, to, and
Osaka and Kyoto, fu. Japan has a unitary central government so prefectures lack many of the powers of
states in the United States.
2
Kasuga, 1538 HANREI JIH6 at 187. The two districts compared were the seventh district of Tokyo
and the third district of Ehime prefecture. The actual disparity was 2.82 to one. Id
' "All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political,
economic, or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin." NIHONKOKU
KENP6 (Constitution of Japan), art. 14, translatedin MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, The Constitution of Japan and
Criminal Statutes (1958) [hereinafter KENP6,].
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constitutional because it did not exceed the reasonable limits of discretion
4
of the national Diet."
The chronic malapportionment of Japan's electoral system was
partially corrected in 1994, but on-going population shifts combined with
legislative inaction and the Supreme Court's unwillingness to demand a
more equitable election system ensure that the malapportionment problem
will continue.
The negative impact of these disparities affects more than just the
theoretical equality interests of those disadvantaged. The legislatures so
elected have, for example, over-represented the farm districts. One apparent
result is that Diet-passed laws have mandated a very costly rice production
and distribution system to the detriment of the general consumer, who must
pay about six times the U.S. price for rice. In addition, the protection of
rice and other agricultural commodities has caused great problems with
6
Japan's trading partners, especially the United States.
This Comment first describes the background and development of the
vote disparity problem. Second, it describes the inadequate attempts by the
Supreme Court and by the Diet to deal with the issue. Third, it discusses
solutions. Finally, it will show that the Court can and should implement a
simple solution with future malapportionment cases to end more than three
decades of grossly inequitable representation.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

The JapaneseMalapportionmentProblem

Japanese voters in under-represented electoral districts are
disadvantaged because they are given only one vote while their compatriots
in better-represented districts have, in effect, two or more votes. The
disparity ratio is calculated by dividing the number of voters in a district by
the number of seats allocated to the district. This quotient is then compared
4

Kasuga, 1538 HANREI JIHO at 187.

The national parliament (kokka) is called the "Diet" in

English.
Mayumi Itoh, Kome Kaikoku andJapanese Internationalism,34 ASIAN SURV. 991, 997 (1994).
6 Japan finally agreed in the recent World Trade Organization agreement to allow four percent of its
rice market to be filled by foreign rice. Hisane Masaki, Realism vs. APEC Free-TradeIdealism, JAPAN
TIMES WKLY (int'l ed.), Oct. 9-15, 1995, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, CURNWS File. The ratio
is to rise to eight percent in 2000. Total OverhaulNeeded to Save Rice Farming, THE NIKKEI WKLY, Sept.
19, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, PAPERS File.
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to similar quotients from other districts to derive the imbalance ratio. For
example, if prefecture X has 4,000,000 voters and four seats, while
prefecture Y has 400,000 voters and two seats, the imbalance ratio would be
1,000,000:200,000 or 5:1. Consequently, one vote in prefecture Y has the
weight or effect of five votes in prefecture X, so voters in prefecture Y are
advantaged. The overall imbalance used in the malapportionment cases
compares the worst represented of all districts with the best.
1.

The Constitution, the Civil Law, and the Election Law

After its defeat in the Second World War, Japan adopted a new,
democratic Constitution drafted by the Allied Occupation led by the United
States.7 The original draft was revised somewhat to fit Japanese custom
before it was submitted to the Diet for approval. 8 This new Constitution
mandated that there would be only one court system 9 and that it would have
the power to review and rule on the constitutionality of law and regulation.'
The Constitution also provided for a legislative branch consisting of a
House of Councillors and a House of Representatives."
It is particularly germane to the vote disparity problem that the new
Constitution does not contain a clause mandating allocation of legislators
and periodic reapportionment of the nation's electoral districts by
population or otherwise. It provides only that these matters be decided by
law.' 2
See, e.g., Charles L. Kades, The American Role in Revising Japan'sImperial Constitution, 104
POL. SC. Q. 215, 223-28.
' Id at 235-4 1. Kades describes the process as "[t]he bilateral making of the Japanese Constitution"
but "[niot entirely a voluntary enactment."
Id at 228. (One can understand the possibility of
understatement by Kades if one remembers that Japan was under a military occupation led by the nation
that had just defeated Japan at war.) The new constitution passed the House of Representatives by a vote
of 342 to five. Id. at 241. The vote in the House of Peers was 298 to two per General Whitney, chief of
the Government Section under General MacArthur.
Lawrence W. Beer, Japan: I. The Present
ConstitutionalSystem of Japan, in CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN LATE TwENTIETH CENTURY ASIA 175,
180 (Lawrence W. Beer ed., 1992).
"The whole judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are
established by law." KENP6, art. 76, para. 1. "No extraordinary tribunal shall be established, nor shall any
organ or agency of the Executive be given final judicial power." Art. 76, para. 2.
'0 "The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of any
law, order, regulation or official act." KENP6, art. 81.
KENPO, art. 42.
The Japanese Constitution addresses neither the allocation of Diet seats nor enumeration (census).
It states only that "[ellectoral districts, method of voting and other matters ... shall be fixed by law."
KENP6, art. 47. As we shall see, this is a case of setting the foxes to guard the hen house. Cf U.S. CONST.
2
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The central legal codes adapted from the civil law tradition of
continental Europe 3 were maintained after the war, albeit with some
significant changes.' 4 Thus, although the Constitution was primarily
inspired by the common law tradition, the special regard for positive, or
enacted law, remained. In this tradition, judicial remedies are mostly
limited to those set forth in law. Common law judicial remedies such as
mandamus, injunction, and contempt are not available unless the enacted
law so provides. 5
The election law passed by the legislature under the authority
delegated to it by the Constitution, the Public Officials Election Law
("Election Law"), 6 stipulates the number of members to be elected to the
House of Representatives and to the House of Councillors. Until the 1994
reform, Schedule I of the Law divided the country into districts and
allocated seats for Representatives. 1'
Schedule II did the same for
Councillors. 8
Under the current law, one hundred of the 252 Councillors are elected
from a single nationwide district.1 9 The remaining seats are allocated to the

art. I, § 2 cl. 3. ("Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states ... according to their
respective numbers . . . Enumeration shall be made . . . every . . . ten years . . . . The number of
representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each state shall have at least one
representative.").
13 Between 1896 and 1907, Japan promulgated legal codes based primarily on German law.
JOHN
HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 510-11
(1994).
14 All five major codes were revised. DAN FENNO HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN:
LAW AND POLICIES 170 (1973). The five major codes are the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, and the Commercial Code. Id at 171.
" Yasuhiro Okudaira, Forty Years of the Constitution, 53 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 17, 35 (Fall
1990).
6 Kashoku senkyoho (Law No. 100 of 1950), § 4(1), currently fixes the number of Representatives
at 500; § 4(2) fixes the number of Councillors at 252 (Kishoku senkyoh6 as amended through Law No. 91
(1995)). The Constitution, art. 45, makes the term of office of members of the House of Representatives
four years, or less if that house is dissolved. Article 46 makes the term of office of the House of
Councillors six years, with election of half the members every three years. The two houses are not equal:
Article 59(2) states that a two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives can override a contrary vote
by the House of Councillors. Article 67 requires the Prime Minister to be designated from among the
members of the Diet by a resolution of the Diet.
"7 Kashoku senkyoho, Sched. I. See infra note 118 for description of changes under the new law.
The first general election under the new law was held on October 20, 1996. Therefore, no court case has
been tried under the 1994 revision of the law, and all case discussion here involves the Election Law prior
to 1994. See infra note 197.
" Id at Sched. IT. Now Schedules I and 11cover the House of Representatives, while Schedule Ill
covers the House of Councillors. Kishoku senkyoho (as amended in 1994).
9 Id. § 4(2).
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prefectures.2" Because the Constitution sets six-year terms for Councillors,
with half elected every three years,21 each prefecture is allocated at least two
Councillors.22 As a result, sparsely populated prefectures that would have
deserved only one seat based on population received two seats. Thus, from
the beginning, there was an imbalance of almost two to one between the
worst- and best-represented prefectures.23
In contrast, seats in the House of Representatives were initially
allocated strictly on the basis of population so that there was no major
imbalance in the House at the outset.24 However, like the Constitution, the
Election Law does not mandate reapportionment. Although the original
Election Law anticipated the need to reapportion, it stated merely that the
allocation schedule for the House of Representatives was suggested to be
revised every five years.25 It is instructive that the phrase was is suggested
to be revised (o rei to suru), not must be revised, which in the original

Japanese makes redistricting a recommended practice instead of a legal
commandment.26

" Id. § 4(2) and Sched. 11 (Sched. IIl after the 1994 reform). These schedules simply list the
electoral districts and the number of seats allocated to each district.
2 "The term of office of members of the House of Councillors shall be six years, and election for
half the members shall take place every three years." KENP6, art. 46. Cf U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 1:
"The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen ... for six
years." Section 3 clause 2 requires one third of the senators to be chosen every second year.
22 The Constitution does not require two members from each prefecture. This is an interpretation
implemented through the Election Law. Prefectures lacking the population to warrant two or more
Councillors could have been given only one. The Constitution requires only that half of all Councillors be
elected every three years. It does not require that each prefecture have a seat contested in every election.
KENP6, art. 46.
" The ratio was 1.88 to one based on the 522,884 population of Tokyo compared to 278,715 in
Tottori. Both got two seats. Teruya Abe, Ippyd no kakusa to ho no moto no byodo [The Difference in One
Vote and Equality under the Law], 830 JuRISUTO 49 (1985).
24 Hiroyuki Hata, Malapportionmentof Representationin the National Diet, 53 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROBS. 157, 158 (Spring 1990). In April 1950, the imbalance ratio was 1.51 to one. Koshiyama v. Tokyo
Election Commission (Koshiyama 11), 37 Minshtl 1243, 1271 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov. 7, 1983)(Dand6, J.,
dissenting).
2
Koshoku senkyoh6 [Public Officials Election Law], Schedule I (Law No. 100 of 1950). A national
census (kokusei chdia) is carried out every five years, e.g., 1980, 1985, 1990. See also infra note 128.
26 Id Schedule I. The full sentence is Honpy6 wa kono hiritsu shikd no hi kara gonen goto ni
chokkin ni okanawaretakokusei chdisa niyotte, kdsei suru no o rei to suru [This schedule is suggested to be
revised, based on the most recent national census, every five years from the day of promulgation of this
law]. There was no such statement in the allocation schedule for the House of Councillors. Id Schedule II
(now Schedule 111).
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Demographics: DisparitiesCausedby PopulationShifts

As Japan recovered from the devastation of the Second World War
and the industrialization of the economy accelerated, the population shifted
massively toward urban areas. 27 Tokyo more than doubled in size during a
nationwide population shift of thirty per cent in favor of the cities from
1950 to 1975.28 During this period vote weight disparities in the House of
Representatives rose to 3.21 to one in 1960 and to 4.99 to one in 1972,
despite reapportionment under the Election Law in 1964.29 Disparities of
over three to one have been endemic. In 1985, the ratio hit 5.12 to one,
despite another revision of the Law in 1975.30 The Law was revised again
in 1986, yet by 1990, the ratio had reached 3.38 to one. 31 Reapportionment
has clearly not kept pace with shifts in the population. As discussed above,
neither the Constitution nor the Election Law mandates regular periodic
reapportionment. Thus, given that the self-interest of the individual
legislator and the interest of the ruling political party normally benefit from
the status quo, the system is left without an automatic correction
mechanism. As discussed later, some of these revisions came under
influence from court decisions that were helpful, if inadequate.32
B.

Affected Citizens and the Supreme Court Attempt to Deal with the
Disparity

Although in theory courts in the civil law tradition give complete
deference to the written law and to the legislatures that enact the law,
Japanese courts have not invariably limited themselves to a literal reading
of the letter of the law.33 The malapportionment suits also involve a broad
27 Hata, supranote 24, at 159.

2' Zadankai-Giin teisd iken hanketsu o megutte [Panel Discussion of the Decision on the
Unconstitutionalityof Diet Seat Apportionment], 617 JURISUTO 14, 33 (1976), cited in 9 LAW IN JAPAN
151, 151 (1976).
29 See infra notes 166-69 and accompanying chart.
0 See infra note 170 and accompanying chart.
"
See infra note 170 and accompanying chart.
32 See infra text accompanying note 173.
31 See, e.g., discussion of the expansive use of the abuse of right doctrine in Kazuaki Sono
&
Yasuhiro Fujioka, The Role of the Abuse ofRight Doctrine in Japan, 35 LA. L. REV. 1037, 1037-40, 104346 (1975). See also Shoji Kawakami, Precontractual Liability: Japan, in PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY:
REPORTS TO THE XIIITH CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 205-21

(E.H. Hondius ed. 1990), excerpted in MERRYMAN, supra note 13, at 1227-30. Kawakami thinks it
"[r]emarkable that the judiciary has been imposing new duties on precontractual bargaining despite the

JANUARY 1997

REDUCING MALAPPORTIONMENT IN JAPAN

reading of Constitution and statute. In hearing these lawsuits as well as in
determining the allowable level of disparity, the Court has, in effect, created
law.

Two landmark cases established the right to bring malapportionment
suits and began to set a limit on the level of disparity that would be allowed
by the Japanese Supreme Court. In 1964, the first malapportionment case,
Koshiyama v. Chairman of the Tokyo Election Commission ("Koshiyama
1,),34

established the right of voters to bring malapportionment suits under

section 204 of the Election Law. Yet, section 204 is meant to be applied to

irregularities in the election procedure at the level of the local election
commission.35 Koshiyama I also established that the Court would, at some
(unspecified) level of extreme inequality of the vote, decide that the Diet

had exceeded its discretionary limits regarding apportionment.36
In 1976, Kurokawa v. Chiba Election Commission37 found that an
unconstitutionally extreme level of inequality had been reached,38 and that

the Diet failed to correct the imbalance within a "reasonable period" of
time. 39 Thus, the imbalance was declared unconstitutional. 0 However, the

Court avoided the disruptive effect of invalidating a national election by
borrowing an administrative law principle (the jij6 hanketsu or
"circumstances decision") that allows courts to declare a law or an act
illegal but refuse to reverse or invalidate it.4
absence of specific legislation in the Civil Code." Id. at 1228. See also HIDEO TANAKA, JIr-rEI H6GAKU
NYOMON [INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF POSITIVE LAW) (3d ed., 1974). Tanaka cites as a "remarkable
example" the decision of the Great Court of Cassation (predecessor to the Supreme Court) to allow a
tenant's hardship to be considered even though both the law itself and the legislative record said not. Id at
99-102. in that situation, so much of the housing stock had been destroyed during the war that evicted
tenants would have had no place to live. Thus, Japan's legal tradition allows equitable action by the courts
in fact if not in theory.
4 Koshiyama v. Chairman of the Tokyo Election Commission, 18 Minshii 270 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Feb.
5, 1964), translatedin HIROSHI ITOH & LAWRENCE W. BEER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN,
1961 THROUGH 1970 53 (1978).
" Id at 276 (Sait6, J., dissenting).
36

ld at 273.

Kurokawa v. Chiba Election Commission, 30 Minshfi 223 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 14, 1976),
translated in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970
THROUGH 1990 355 (1996).
31 Id at 248.
19 Id. at 249.
40 Id Note that the Court is distinguishing between an "unconstitutionally extreme" level of
inequality and an actual declaration of unconstitutionality. For examples of cases in which the imbalance
was found unconstitutionally extreme, but the imbalance was not declared unconstitutional, see infra note
99.
" 30 Minshfi at 254.
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The Seminal Case: The JusticiabilityPrinciplein Koshiyama I

On July 19, 1962, Yasushi Koshiyama, a young University of Tokyo
law graduate, sued to invalidate the House of Councillors election held on
July 1, 1962.42 At the time of the election, Schedule II allocated eight seats
to 5,922,100 voters in the Tokyo district and two seats to 362,182 voters in
Tottori. Thus the number of voters per Councillor was 740,263 in Tokyo,
versus only 181,091 in Tottori, a ratio of 4.09 to one.43 The Tokyo High
Court dismissed the case."
Koshiyama appealed to the Japanese Supreme Court, which
dismissed the suit. Yet the Court broke new constitutional ground when it
commented on the threshold issue of justiciability. 4' The Court observed
that the Constitution does not specify that the number of voters per Diet seat
be equal.46 It stated that "absent an extreme inequality" in the allocation of
seats, apportionment was a matter within the discretionary powers of the
legislature.4 7 The obvious implication was that malapportionment suits
would be entertained if such extreme inequality arose. 48 The Court ruled

" Yasushi Koshiyama et al., IPPYO NO KACHI, GIIN TEISO TO KOKUMIN NO KENRI [THE VALUE OF
ONE VOTE, DIET SEATS AND THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE] 7, 179 (1985). The case was Koshiyama v.
Chairman of the Tokyo Election Commission, 18 Minshi 303, 308 (Tokyo High Ct., Jan. 30, 1963).
Koshiyama had read about how the U.S. courts could decide whether legislative seats had been apportioned
equally based on proportionality to population. Koshiyama, supra, at 7. Baker v. Carr was decided on
March 26, 1962. The U.S. Supreme Court held that allegations that the debasement of the vote caused by
failure of the Tennessee legislature to reapportion constituted a justiciable cause of action under the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 369 U.S. 186, 194, 237 (1962). Koshiyama freely cited
Baker v. Carr and other American sources in his brief for the Japanese Supreme Court. 18 Minshai 270,
300. 4
18 Minsh6i 270, 271, 312. The number
of seats actually contested at the election
was half the
number allocated, following Article 46 of the Constitution.
44 18 Minshu at 303, 311. The High Court held that apportionment was
left to the discretion of the
legislature. However, the court also said in dictum that if the imbalance were so great as to exceed the
limits of allowable discretion, then the law should be interpreted as being in violation of the Constitution.
Importantly also, the court explicitly rejected the defendant's argument that the claim was not justiciable.
Id. at 309-10.
"' Id at 273. Black's Law Dictionary states that a justiciable controversy is a "real and substantial
controversy which is appropriate for judicial determination, as distinguished from dispute or difference of
contingent, hypothetical or abstract character." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 599 (Abridged 6th ed. 1991).
" 18 MinshO at 272.
17 ld at 273.
41 It is, of course, what the Court implied that broke new constitutional ground, not what it decided.
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that the inequality in this case did not rise to the level of a violation of
Article 14(1) of the Constitution. 9
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kitar6 Sait6 strongly doubted that the
Court could both declare the issue to be outside the scope of judicial review

and yet reserve for itself the power to entertain extreme cases."0 He argued
that the courts should not intervene in such a quintessentially political
matter, and quoted from Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Baker v. Carr:'

The Court's authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the
sword-ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its
moral sanction. Such feeling mustbe nourished by the Court's
complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political
entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into the

clash of political forces in political settlements.5 2
In 1976, Kurokawa"3 explained the rationale for finding justiciability
in malapportionment suits. The Court stated that although there was doubt
that section 204 of the Election Law was meant to cover such suits, there

was no other way to contest a violation of this fundamental right.5 4 The
Court thus settled that malapportionment could be litigated under both the
Constitution and the Election Law.

9 Id KENP6, art. 14. See also Hata, supra note 24, at 161. Hata states that the Koshiyama I Court
was influenced by Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), but Reynolds was decided in June, more than
four months after Koshiyama I. The more likely influence was Baker.
'0 18 Minsho at 273-74 (Sait6, J., dissenting).
" Koshiyama 1, 18 Minshfi at 274-75. In Baker v. Carr the U. S. Supreme Court stated that "the
complaint's allegations of a denial of equal protection present a justiciable [Federal] constitutional cause of
action upon which appellants are entitled to a trial and a decision." 369 U.S. at 237. Despite an increase of
more than four times in the number of eligible voters from 1901 to 1961, Tennessee had not reapportioned
its legislature. 369 U.S. at 192-93. "[A] single vote in Moore County, Tennessee, is [said to be] worth 19
votes in Hamilton County ....
369 U.S. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring).
52 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
3 Kurokawa, 30 Minshii 223.
' Id. at 251-52. The Court also stated that the Constitution, arts. 14(1) (equality), 15(1) (right to
choose public officials), 15(3) (universal suffrage), and 44 (no discrimination in voter qualifications),
meant that the value of each vote should be equal. Id at 243.
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Koshiyama I, Kurokawa, and Progeny: How Much Inequality is Too
Much?

In Koshiyama I, the Court reasoned that apportionment was a matter
of legislative policy. The Constitution provides that the number of seats in
the two houses, districting, and voting regulations be fixed by law.55 The
Court stated that it was desirable from the principle of equality that the
apportionment of Diet seats to electoral districts be proportional to
population. 6 However, the Court said, there are other factors that affect the
apportionment decision such as the history, physical size and administrative
divisions of the districts,57 as well as the constitutional requirement that
only half of the Councillors be elected per election.5" The Court then ruled
that a ratio of 4.09 to one was not the extreme inequality that would spur the
59
Court into action.
In 1976, the Court revisited the malapportionment issue in the
landmark Kurokawa case. Here, the Court confronted an imbalance
between the best-represented Hy6go Fifth District and the worst-represented
Osaka Third District of 4.99 to one in a House of Representatives election.60
The Court reasoned that the right to vote was a fundamental right that
guaranteed the opportunity for the people to participate in the national
government. 61 The majority also stated that vote equality meant eliminating
barriers to voter eligibility and giving each voter an equal voice in the
outcome of an election.62 At the same time, the Court stated that complete
equality of the vote could not be assured in the voting system. 63 The Court
indicated that the legislature has the discretion to take into account various

15 KENP6, art. 47, states: "Electoral districts, method of voting and other matters
... shall be fixed
by law." KENP6, art. 43, para. 2, states: "The number of the members of each House shall be fixed by
law." Koshiyama 1, 18 Minshfi at 272.
56 18 Minshi at 272-73.
Id. at 273.
s KENP6, art. 46.
s9 18 Minshi at 273. The Court did not mention any numbers. It merely said that the level

complained of was within the bounds of legislative discretion. Id For the statistics, see supra note 43 and
accompanying text.

60 30 Minshfi at 248, 280. Thus it took almost five Osaka voters to equal the voice of one Hy6go
voter in their respective representation in the Diet.
6 Id. at 242.
62 Id.

65 Id. at 243-44.
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factors to create an election system that provides fair and effective
representation.64
Nonetheless, the Court found that in this case the 4.99 to one
imbalance in the value of the vote in Hy6go versus Osaka had surpassed a
level that generally could be thought reasonable.65 Since the Court saw no
"special reason" to justify such an imbalance,66 it held that the imbalance
violated the constitutionally guaranteed equality of the vote.67
6
In 1983, in Shimizu v. Osaka Election Commission, 1 the Court
considered the July 1977 House of Councillors election, in which the
imbalance ratio had reached 5.26 to one.69 The Court summarized its
on general principles, concluding, "[w]e see no need to
Kurokawa reasoning
70
now.",
this
change
Following the specific Kurokawa holding exactly would have
obligated the Court to find the imbalance unconstitutiotial because the
Shimizu imbalance exceeded the imbalance in Kurokawa. However, the
Court distinguished between the House of Councillors and the House of
Representatives. 7' The opinion spoke of the historical, political, and
economic significance of the representation by Councillors elected from
local districts.72 It also noted that the national constituency of the House of
Councillors73 facilitates the election of professional people of experience
74
and knowledge who represent the different professions in some degree.
' Id.at 244. The Court referred to Constitution arts. 43(2) and 47, which stipulate that the Diet
determine by law the number of legislators, the districts, and voting regulations. Id.
63 Id at 248.
66 ld There is no indication of what might constitute a "special reason."
67

Id.

6

Shimizu v. Osaka Election Commission, 37 Minshfi 345 (Sup. Ct., G.B., April 27, 1983),

translatedin BEER & ITOH, supra note 37, at 375.
9 Id at 348. Kanagawa prefecture had 2,226,926 voters, compared to Tottori prefecture's 423,014.
Id.at 377 (Appellant's brief). Also in this election there were instances of gyakuten [reversal], where a
prefecture with fewer eligible voters had more Diet seats than a more populated prefecture; e.g., Hokkaido
had 371,000 eligible voters, with eight Diet seats, while Kanagawa, with 445,000 voters, had only four
seats, and Osaka, with 560,000 voters, had only six seats. Id at 368 (Taniguchi, J., dissenting).
'o Id. at 349.
71 Id.
" The Court did not give examples of what it meant. There are 152 Councillors elected from local
districts, two from each of the 47 prefectural units, with the remaining 58 allocated to the prefectures on
the basis of population and other factors. Kishoku senkyoho § 4(2) and Sched. II (at the time of Shimizu,
now Sched. III).
"' There are 100 Councillors elected from the national constituency, which treats the entire nation as
one proportional representation voting district. Kishoku senkyoho § 4(2).
14 37 Minsh0i at 350. This is a curious comment by the Court, for the professionals elected, aside
from professional politicians, have tended to be tarento (pop culture icons), mainly famous movie and
television actors, announcers, and authors of popular novels.
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The Court also pointed out that, under the Constitution, Diet members from
local districts provide national as well as prefectural representation.7 5
The Court held that because of the special nature of the House of
Councillors, the 5.26 to one vote imbalance wrought by the apportionment
provision was not extreme, did not exceed the discretionary powers of the
Diet, and therefore, did not violate the Constitution.76 On September 11,
1996, the Court finally found a 6.59 to one imbalance to be extreme.77
Just seven months after Shimizu, the Court issued a ruling in
Koshiyama II, 7 9 which involved a plea to invalidate the House of
Representatives election of June 1980. 79 Following Kurokawa, ° the Court
found that the imbalance of 3.94 to one at the time of the election violated
the Constitution.8
In 1985, in Kanao, the Court cited both Kurokawa and Koshiyama
H82 in deciding that an imbalance of 4.4 to one in a House of
Representatives election was unconstitutional. 3 In 1988, a Supreme Court
panel found an imbalance of 2.92 to one constitutional.8 4 In 1993, in
Kawabara, the full Court found an imbalance of 3.18 to one at the 1990
House of Representatives election unconstitutional.8 5 Finally, the 1995
Kasuga panel ruled that an imbalance of 2.82 to one was constitutional86
71 Id. at 351.
Article 43(1) of the Constitution states: "Both Houses shall consist of elected
members, representative of all the people."
76 Id. at 354. Between Kurokawa and Shimizu the Court had almost completely turned
over. Justice
Shigemitsu Dand6 was the only justice to participate in both decisions. 30 Minshi at 279; 37 MinshOi
at
376.
He was with the majority in Kurokawa, but would have found the Shimizu imbalance
unconstitutional. 30 MinshOi at 254. 37 Minsh at 370, 373. (Dand6, J., dissenting). Supreme Court
justices are usually appointed in their early sixties and must retire at seventy, so the turnover here is
not
unusual for this Court. HIDEO TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, INiRODUCTORY CASES AND
MATERIALS 694 (Hideo Tanaka ed., 1976)
77 Kakusa 6.59 bai wa ikenjdtai, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Sept. 12,
1996, at I. See infra note 193
for discussion. Contrast the U.S. Senate: The inequality ratio in 1993 between California and Wyoming
was 66 to one. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF

THE UNITED STATES 27 (114th ed. 1994). However, the U.S. Constitution requires that there be
two
Senators per state. The Japanese Constitution simply requires "elected members, representative of all
the
people." KENP6, art. 43.
" 37 MinshOi 1243.
'9 Id at 1257-59.
Ild. at 1262.
s Id. at 1262-63.
2 39 MinshOi at 1120.
Id. at 1120-22.
42 MinshFa 644, 663.
s5 47 Minsh0i at 86-87.
s6 Kasuga, 1538HANREIJIH6 185.
'3
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These subsequent cases have added little to the doctrine.
Nevertheless, the cases have played an important role in defining the level
of inequality at a House of Representatives election that could be found
unconstitutional by the Court. As the following chart reflects, the Court
implicitly has settled on a ratio of three to one as the boundary between
constitutional and unconstitutional levels of imbalance.
Decision
Kurokawa
Koshiyama 1187

Kanao8 8
Miyakawa 9
Kawabara9°
Kasuga9 1
3.

Year
1976
1983
1985
1988
1993
1995

Imbalance
4.99:1
3.94:1
4.40:1
2.92:1
3.18:1
2.82:1

Constitutional?
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes

The Reasonable PeriodDoctrine

One might expect that once the Supreme Court had found an
unconstitutional imbalance in the value of the vote, the Court would take
action to force reapportionment. Instead, judicial restraint and deference to
92
the legislature are apparent again. The Court uses the "reasonable period"
doctrine to determine whether the Diet has acted in a timely manner once an
unconstitutional level of imbalance has been reached. If the "reasonable
period" had not expired at the time of the contested election, the Court will
not declare the apportionment provision of the Election Law
unconstitutional .9
The Kurokawa Court reasoned that a law that loses its
constitutionality due to gradually changing conditions must be considered
with circumspection.94 In this case, the Court considered the movements of
population and the impracticality of rapid changes in the apportionment of
:7
g

Koshiyama 11,
37 Minshfi at 1243.
Kanao v. Hiroshima Election Commission, 39 MinshOi 1100 (Sup. Ct., G.B., July 17, 1985),

translated in BEER & ITOH, supra note 37, at 394.

9 Miyakawa v. Chiba Election Commission, 42 MinshFa 644 (Sup. Ct., P.B., Oct. 21, 1988).
Kawabara v. Tokyo Election Commission, 47 MinshOi 67 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Jan. 29, 1993).
9' Kasuga, 1538 HANREI JIH6 185.
92 Kurokawa, 30 MinshOi at 248-49.
93 Id. at 248.

94 Id
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Diet seats. It stated that only when constitutionally required reforms are not
carried out within a reasonable period can the law be determined to be
unconstitutional.95
The Court then referred to the provision in the Election Law that
Schedule I was suggested to be revised every five years based on the most
recent National Census.96 Based on the fact that eight years had passed
between the contested election of 1972 and the prior Schedule I reform of
1964, the Court found that the reasonable period had passed. 97 Therefore, it
held that the apportionment scheme in Kurokawa violated the constitutional
requirement of equal voting rights.98 This reasonable period test has been
applied to the three subsequent cases where vote imbalances in House of
Representatives' elections were found to be at an unconstitutional level. 99
4.

The Jij6 Hanketsu or "Circumstances Decision": Prior Elections
Will Not Be Invalidated

For the malapportionment litigant who can prove both an
unconstitutional imbalance level and a passage of time beyond the
reasonable period, the Court has created one last barrier to relief: the jij6
hanketsu or "circumstances decision."' 00
After the Kurokawa Court declared the
apportionment
unconstitutional,' 0 ' it discussed the ramifications of invalidating the
contested election. 0 2 According to the Court, such an action would
invalidate all the laws passed since that election. °3 In addition, the Court
stated that without a House of Representatives, it would be impossible to

9'Id at 248-49.
See supra notes 25, 26 and accompanying text.
'"
30 MinshO at 249. The election contested in Kurokawa was held in 1972. Id. at 224.
9 Id. at 249. But the Court did not invalidate the election. See infra note 110 and accompanying
text.

Koshtyama 11,
37 Minshil at 1264-65 (within reasonable period, so no constitutional violation);
Kanao, 39 MinshOi at 1122 (reasonable period exceeded); Kawabara, 47 MinshO at 87-88 (within
reasonable period).
100 30 MinshfO at 252-54. The Court does not use the tennjUj6 hanketsu here, but the idea is clearly
discussed.
'01
102

Id.at 249.
Id. at 250-52.

103 Id. at 250-5 1.
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reform the Election Law itself.10 4

The Court declared such a situation

neither desirable under nor anticipated by the Constitution.l°5
The Court extracted from the Administrative Case Litigation Law

("ACLL") the basic general legal principle that judgments against an
administrative entity may be set aside in certain situations of great public
consequence.'0 6 The Court recognized that normal suits under section
204107 of the Election Law may not be defeated by the use of the jiJ5
08
However, the Court found it appropriate to borrow the
hanketsu.1
principle for malapportionment cases, where there was no other method of
contesting an election, but the remedy, setting aside an election, would
greatly harm the public interest.'0 9 The Court then applied the jij6 hanketsu
doctrine to this case. Although the Court had declared the election illegal,
the election was allowed to stand."t0
Only one subsequent case has seen the application of the jij4:
hanketsu, but it would appear to present an impenetrable barrier to the
malapportionment litigant's desire to have a contested election
overturned.t "'

104

Id. KENPO, art. 41, states: "The Diet... shall be the sole law-making organ of the State."

I0s

30 MinshFa at 250.

Id. Gytseijiken soshMh6 [Administration Case Litigation Law], Law No. 139 (1962), § 31(1),
allows the setting aside of a ruling of illegality against an administrative disposition or ruling if not setting
it aside would result in great damage to the public interest. In such a case, this law requires the court to
declare in its holding (shubun) that the disposition or ruling was illegal.
107
Kashoku senkyoho, § 204, allows a voter or candidate to bring suit against the relevant election
commission in High Court to dispute the validity of the election in his or her district. The Court said that it
had doubts about the appropriateness of the use of section 204 for objections to the entire apportionment
scheme, but that it was the only way for voters to protest the constitutionality of the apportionment. 30
Minshu at 251. Fraudulent voting or counting of votes is the type of infraction section 204 was designed to
handle.
103 30 MinshO at 253. Kishoku senkyoh6, § 219, says that the jyo hanketsu provided in ACLL, §
31 (1), may not be used in suits brought under the Election Law.
109
30 Minshu at 251-54.
[o Id at 254. Although the Court said it was just borrowing the principle, it included the
declaration of illegality of the election in its shubun, just as though it were following the letter of ACLL, §
31(1), which requires such action. Id. at 240-41.
II
In Kanao, again facing an unconstitutional apportionment law, the Court used the Kurokawa
logic to apply the jijo hanketsu, declaring the election illegal, but not invalidating it. 39 MinshOi at 112224. None of the subsequent cases has had to address this issue. My akawa, 42 MinshOi at 663 (imbalance
not unconstitutional); Kawabara, 47 MinshOi at 86-88 (imbalance unconstitutional but within reasonable
106

period); Kasuga, 1538 HANREI JIHO at 187 (imbalance not unconstitutional).
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Election Law Revisions: Too Little, Too Late

The Diet has revised the apportionment of the House of
Representatives only five times since the Election Law was passed in 1950.
In 1964, the first revision of the 1950 Election Law reduced the
apportionment imbalance to 2.19 to one by adding nineteen seats to the
House of Representatives. 1 2 The 1975 revision, which added twenty
seats," 3 brought the ratio to 2.92 to one.' 14 The 1986 revision, which added
a total of eight seats to certain districts while subtracting seven seats from
others," 5' brought the ratio to 2.99 to one.' 1 6 The 1992 revision, which
added nine and subtracted ten, reduced the imbalance to about 2.8 to one."17
Finally, the major system revision of 1994"18 reduced the ratio to 2.137 to
one. 119
Although the Diet made extensive changes to the election system in
1994, the need for reform has not been fully satisfied. The House of
Councillors was not adequately reapportioned. 20 Redistricting continues to
be discretionary, but the suggested frequency was reduced to ten years from
five years. 121 As a result, the tendency of the system to go out of balance
and stay that way for long periods will continue unless something new is
22
done. 1

112
113

Abe, supra note 23, at 49.

Id.
47 MinshO at 100 (Hashimoto, J., dissenting).
it
Toshihiko Nonaka, Senkyo hasei [The Election System], 1073 JURISUTO 26, 31 (1995).
116
47 Minshii at 100 (Hashimoto, J., dissenting).
117
Nonaka, supra note 115.
18
Under the new system, the 500 House of Representatives seats are allocated 200 to II regional
blocks using proportional representation, and 300 to single seat districts in the prefectures. Kishoku
senkyohs§§ 4(l), 13(1)(2) and Schedules 1, 11.
19
See infra note 172.
120
The only revisions in Koshoku senkyoh6 Schedule 11,which apportioned the seats of the House
of Councillors, were in 1972, to add two seats upon the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, and in 1994, to
reallocate eight seats. At the 1992 election, the imbalance was 6.59 to one.
This was ruled
unconstitutional by one High Court (Tanoue v. Osaka Election Commission, 838 HANREI TAIMUZU 85
(Osaka High Ct., Dec. 16, 1993)) but the Supreme Court overruled. See infra note 193. The 1994
reallocations brought the ratio down to 4.81 to one. Nonaka, supra note 115, at 31. With the 1994
Election Law reform, Schedule I! was redesignated Schedule III.
121
Kishoku senkyohd Schedule 1, now states: "This schedule is suggested to be revised according
to the result of the National Census [that is carried out every ten years] ....
One would hope the Court
will not now use ten years as the yardstick for its "reasonable period" analysis.
22
Nonaka, supra note 115, at 31. As indicated infra note 172, the imbalance apparently slipped
from 2.137 to one, to 2.22 to one between August and December 1994.
14
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ANALYSIS

The malapportionment problem could be rectified in many ways. For
instance, the Constitution could be amended to make reapportionment
mandatory; the Election Law could be similarly amended; or the Court
could make its rulings more quickly and reduce the "constitutionally
acceptable" level of imbalance. Constitutional and Election Law reform
face formidable obstacles, but the Court can and should act to cut this
Gordian knot.
ConstitutionalAmendment: Effective But Unlikely

A.

The most effective solution to the chronic malady of
malapportionment is also the most difficult to implement. The Japanese
Constitution should be amended to require redistricting and
Although the
reapportionment as indicated by a periodic census.
amendment process is not particularly onerous, the Constitution has never
been amended.'2 3 From its inception, revision of the new Constitution has
been such a sensitive issue between the political left and right that many
have taken a firm stand against any amendment whatsoever.'24 A two-thirds
25
vote in each House followed by a majority vote of the people is required.
A recent national poll showed fifty percent of respondents in favor of and
forty-three percent against amending the Constitution. 26 Although this
suggests a vote on a constitutional amendment might succeed with the
voters, the two-thirds requirement in the Diet on this issue is problematic.
Revision of the electoral system is against the interests of sitting Diet
123
The post-war Constitution was adopted as an amendment replacing the entire Meiji
Constitution. With that special exception the Meiji Constitution was also never amended. Tanaka, supra
note 76, at 638. See also Beer, supranote 8, at 197.
124
Tanaka, supra note 76, at 665-66.
125
KENP6, art. 96(1). ("Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a
concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted
to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon,
at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify."). Cf. the U.S. CONST. art. V. ("The

Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments. . . , or,

on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid ... when ratified by the Legislatures of three

fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof ... ").
126

Nihon no sengo: 76% ga hydka [Seventy-six Percent Give Good Marks to Postwar Japan],

NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Aug. 15, 1995, at 1. Almost 22 percent felt the constitutional articles concerning
the Diet, including the bicameral system, no longer matched the times.
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members who typically have nothing to gain by reapportionment and their
own seats, or careers, to lose. Thus, while a constitutional amendment
could be the best long-term solution to the malapportionment problem,
other solutions that are more likely to be implemented must be
considered. 127
B.

MandatingReapportionmentin the Election Law: Also Unlikely

The next-best solution would be for the Diet to amend the Election
Law to mandate redistricting and apportionment based on the regular
National Census. 128
The amendment should also provide powers of
injunction and mandamus to the courts for the enforcement of
apportionment. 129 As with a constitutional amendment, the self-interest of
sitting Diet members makes mandating reapportionment under the Election
Law an unlikely exercise. Nor is the Diet likely to provide enforcement
powers to the courts, for these powers necessarily trench upon the powers of
the Diet itself.
C.

The Keikoku Hanketsu: Warn, Then Invalidate If No Action

Several of the justices in the malapportionment cases have suggested
a solution in the form of a keikoku hanketsu, or warning decision. 30 Under
this decision, the Court would rule the apportionment illegal and invalidate
the protested election as of a future date in order to give the Diet time to
17
Discussion of such an amendment to the Constitution might also stimulate debate on
the
important question of regional representation. Should the Japanese people want every prefecture to have at
least two Councillors and at least one Representative, then it should be written into the Constitution.
128
The census could be the full census every ten years or that plus the shorter form census at
intervening five-year intervals. Absent massive shifts like that from 1950 to 1975, the longer interval
would suffice if reapportionment were mandatory. See supraPart II.A.2.
129
As courts in a primarily civil law country, Japanese courts do not have the equitable powers of a
common law court and can exercise these powers only if written into the positive law. Positive law means
written law as opposed to judge-made law. Civil laws systems, in principle, do not consider case precedent
a source of law. But see Hiroyuki Hata, ken rippd shinsasei [Judicial Review], 1073 JURISUTO 33, 36
(1995)(Japanese court has made law under its U.S.-style system ofjudicial review).
130 See, e.g., Kanao, 39 Minshfa at 1125-26 (Terada, Kinoshita, Ito, and Yaguchi, JJ., concurring);
Kawabara,47 MinshO at 91, 111, 114 (Sonobe, J., concurring; Nakajima, Sato, JJ., dissenting). The Court
does not use the term keikoku hanketsu here, but the idea is clearly discussed. This idea may have been
borrowed from the German Federal Constitutional Court. Hata, supra note 24, at 168. But a significant
difference with Japan is that the Federal Constitutional Court is given by law the power to ameliorate
malapportionment, including drawing up an apportionment plan and enforcing it. Id at 170 (citing Federal
Constitutional Court Act, art. 35).
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reapportion. 31 This approach contains a fatal logical flaw in that an
unconstitutionally elected Diet would be allowed to create a constitutionally
correct apportionment."' Nevertheless, it is one practical way for the Court
to invalidate elections under the Election Law without disbanding a sitting
Diet and making impossible any solution to the malapportionment
problem.'
The difficulty remains that in a primarily civil law system,
absent a statute, the Court lacks the power to make such a ruling.'34
Furthermore, in Japan, the Diet is unlikely to provide such a statute. Of
course, the Court might declare that it has the inherent power to invalidate
and will do so if the Diet does not respond appropriately. No Court so far
has felt empowered to do so.
D.

Separability: Untenable Denial ofRepresentation

Another malapportionment solution suggested in several concurring
and dissenting opinions is to treat malapportionment as affecting only the
district of the disadvantaged voter who brings the suit.'35 Only the election
in that district would be invalidated.
Unfortunately, this theory of
separability is untenable because it is the entire apportionment schedule that
is challenged and held to be unconstitutional. 36 In addition, a major

131
132

Kanao, 39 Minshii at 1125-26 (Terada, J., concurring).
KENP6, art. 98(1), states: "This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law,

ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof,
shall have legal force or validity."
133
Professor Nobuyoshi Ashibe, the dean of Japanese constitutional scholars, said, commenting on
Kurokawa, that given the special nature of elections, the American courts' practice of handing down
decisions affecting future elections should be considered [for Japan]. Nobuyoshi Ashibe, Giin teisd haibun
kitei iken hanketsu no igi to mondaiten [The Significance and Problems of the Ruling of Unconstitutionality
of the Diet Seat Apportionment Provision],617 JURISUTO 36, 52 (1976). However, in Japan, if the Diet did
not react within the warning period, the Court would be faced with the same dilemma that brought forth the
jid hanketsu.
134 Just such a warning decision was given by the German Constitutional Court in 1963, but that
court is given the power by law to draw up its own apportionment plan. Hata, supra note 129, at 37.
However, Hata also states that a number of influential scholars have pointed to the U.S.- and U.K.influenced Japanese Constitution and the law-making function of many Japanese court decisions, and
urged that the courts draw up apportionment plans and order elections if the Diet does not promptly react to
Court rulings of unconstitutionality. Id at 36-37.
135
See, e.g., Kurokawa, 30 Minshil at 254-62, 272-73 (Okahara, J., dissenting; Kishi, J.,
dissenting); Kawabara,47 Minshd at 94-95 (Mimura, J., concurring).
136
The Election Law fixes the total number of Representatives, then allocates the seats to the
electoral districts. Thus, a malapportionment suit will always challenge the overall provision, since any
increase to an under-represented district will require legislation to reduce seats of other districts or to
increase the overall number of seats.
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practical objection to this method is that under the Election Law a new
election must be held within forty days.'37 The Diet must revise the
apportionment schedule of the Election Law to add representation to the one
district before the new election can be called.13 8 This method would result
in a revision directly affecting a district without that district being
represented in the deliberations. For the litigant protesting that he or she is
under-represented, taking away all representation would be the ultimate
irony. This is not a solution.139
The Cases and ControversiesRequirement: Likely to Persist

E.

The jy6 hanketsu problem would not arise if the Court could declare
an apportionment provision unconstitutional before an election is held.
Article 81 of the Japanese Constitution gives the Supreme Court the "power
to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official
act."' 4 ° Furthermore, the Japanese Constitution does not on its face restrict
the Court's jurisdiction to cases and controversies.' 4 ' Consequently, some
Japanese scholars formerly argued that a literal reading of article 81 gave
the Japanese Court power similar to that of European constitutional courts
to review legislation in the abstract. 4 '
However, the Japanese Supreme Court refused to become a
constitutional court.'43 In the 1952 case, Suzuki v. Japan,' the Court held

Kishoku senkyohd, § 34(l).
Invalidations of elections for irregularities in campaigning, voting, etc. under section 204 do not
require legislative action, so a new election can be held within such a deadline.
139
Simply increasing the deadline for a new election sufficient to give the Diet time to act would
solve the time problem, but would leave the issue of non-representation. Also, if the Diet then chose just to
reallocate seats, not to increase the total number of Representatives, one or more sitting Diet members from
other districts would have to be "fired" after having properly taken their seats.
140
KENP6, art. 81. Quoted in full, supra note 10.
141
In this sense it is unlike the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl.1.
("The judicial power shall extend to all cases... [and] to controversies ...").
142
DAN FENNO HENDERSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947-1967,
119-20 (Dan F. Henderson ed., 1968). In some civil law countries, but not Japan, there are constitutional
courts that allow for constitutional review of laws. For example, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and
Austria have separate constitutional courts that can entertain constitutional challenges to statutes, even
when there is no specific judicial case or controversy involved. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 136-40
(2d ed., 1985).
143 HENDERSON, supra note 142, at 121.
1"
6 Minshu 783 (Sup. Ct. G.B., Oct. 8, 1952). The case challenged the constitutionality of the
National Police Reserve. HENDERSON, supra note 142, at 121.
137
139
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that article 81 makes the Supreme Court the court of last resort in cases
involving the Constitution and requires a concrete legal dispute. 145
Although Suzuki raised an abstract claim under article 9 of the
Constitution, 146 the decision in Suzuki greatly affects the malapportionment
issue. The cases and controversies requirement established in Suzuki
prevents the Court from invalidating illegal apportionment prior to
elections. If, instead of waiting for an election, the Court could act as soon
as an inequality occurred, the Diet would usually have ample time to
respond prior to the election. This would avoid the confusion that would be
caused by invalidating the only body that had the power to rectify the
situation and would prevent subsequent elections under malapportionment.
However, it is unlikely that the Court would reverse or distinguish
Suzuki to allow judicial review of pre-election malapportionment. Despite
the emphasis on positive law in the civil law tradition, the Japanese courts
are greatly reluctant to overturn case precedent. 47 Also, although the Diet
has reacted to past declarations of unconstitutional apportionment, how the
Diet would react to action by the Court in the absence of a particular case is
not clear. 41 In any case, this is a significant, and unlikely, constitutional
step for a highly deferential Court to take."'

145
146

6 Minsha at 784-85, quoted in HENDERSON, supra note 142, at 121-22.
KENP6, art. 9, states: "(1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and

order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of
force as a means of settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized."
17
The positive law emphasis, in theory, requires the court to go back to the written law in every
case so that case law merely interprets the statute, but does not "make" new law. Scholarly opinion also
now accepts the cases and controversies interpretation of article 81 of the Constitution. Hata, supra note
24, at 33. Ashibe says that because article 81 does not exclude constitutional court powers, the Supreme
Court could act as a constitutional court if the Diet established the appropriate procedural laws. Nobuyoshi
Ashibe, Human Rights andJudicial Power, in CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY
ASIA 238-39 (Lawrence W. Beer ed., 1992).
149
The American Supreme Court's right of judicial review flowed from just such an assumption of
power, backed by Chief Justice Marshall's arguments in dicta, in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch)
137 (1803). (The dispute with the government was avoided on narrow technical grounds. Mr. Marbury did
not get his commission.) The Madison Administration might have not complied had the Court ordered the
government to deliver the commission. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 30 (2d ed.
1991).
149
Ashibe reckons that U.S. constitutional theories and judicial decisions have "drastically turned
Japan away from the legal positivism of prewar Japan." Nevertheless, he thinks "[t]oo much modesty has
been shown and too much deference has been paid to ... the legislative and executive branches. More
deference could be shown to the Constitution's mandate for full protection of human rights." Ashibe,
supra note 147, at 260-61.
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Thus, jiyd hanketsu are apt to occur again in the future. However,
there is a major constitutional problem with the Court's use of this method
to get itself out of the "political thicket"' 5 ° of apportionment. 5'

The

Constitution clearly states: "This Constitution shall be the supreme law of
the nation and no law

. . .

contrary to the provisions hereof[,] shall have

legal force or validity."' 52 When the apportionment provision of the
Election Law is declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court exercising
its article 81 power, the provision should fall lifeless from the books.

Therefore, the jijd hanketsu fails constitutionally and fails as a device
to correct the malapportionment problem. The jij6 hanketsu is merely a
solution to the court's problem.'53 It is not a solution to the vote imbalance

problem.
Nevertheless, there is every reason to expect the jij hanketsu to be
applied in future malapportionment cases, including those involving House
of Councillors' vote imbalances so egregious that the Court cannot continue
to defer to legislative discretion.' 54

[so Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946)("Courts ought not to enter this political
thicket."). The Japanese Court and legal scholars have observed the development of U.S. constitutional
law in this area. Justice Frankfurter's opinion warning against court involvement in the political function
of districting is quoted, for example, by Hiroyuki Hata. Hata, supranote 129 at 36.
"'
Ashibe, writing about Kurokawa, said he had doubts about the logic of the jijo hanketsu, but
that he gave it high marks as a practical way out of a constitutional impasse. Ashibe, supra note 133, at 51.
Ashibe also commented that Professor Hideo Wada had warned that one wrong step and the jjo hanketsu
would be used to ratify unconstitutional fait accompli. Id.
152
KENP6, art. 98. The Court recognizes that "laws which violate the Constitution are, in
principle, void ab initio and the effect of acts carried out thereunder is denied." 30 MinshO at 250. The
Court reasons further that such an interpretation ordinarily applies to prevent an unconstitutional result or
to repair an unconstitutional result. id The Court then accepts the necessity of ignoring article 98, stating
that in the malapportionment situation, invalidating the law would neither prevent nor repair the
unconstitutional condition. Id The Court usually cites constitutional articles to which it is referring. Here
there is no mention of article 98. Also, the Court inserted the phrase, "in principle," in its paraphrase of the
article although no such loophole is available in article 98. Id. The phrase, "in principle," therefore means
nothing other than that the requirement is to be honored in the breach thereof.
153
The Court lacks the legal power to draw up an apportionment scheme, so it cannot turn out
those who, collectively, do have such power; i.e., the dilemma remains if in the Diet's absence, no organ of
government has the power to reapportion.
154
See infra note 193.
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F.

A Workable Solution: The Supreme Court Can and Should Act

1.

Tighten Target Ratio to Two to One
The decisions of the Supreme Court have been important because the

revisions of the Election Law, albeit belated, have carefully brought the
voter imbalance within the target ratio suggested by the Court.' ss Thus,
given the actual impact of the Court's decisions, the most practical solution

to the malapportionment problem is for the Court to tighten its target ratio
for unconstitutionality to two to one. There is excellent reason to expect the

Diet to respond. 56 This is a ratio long called for by certain justices on the
court. 157 Also, scholarly opinion has long called for the application of a two
to one ratio as the imbalance15 closest practically possible to the equality

mandated by the constitution.

1

59
The Court certainly has the ability to change the ratio it established,

but it has never explained why that ratio was chosen over some other
ratio. 60 Additionally, the Court has avoided announcing its exact standard

155
56
57

See chart and discussion infra page 24 ff.
See chart and discussion infra page 24 ff.
For example, dissenting in Koshyama 11, Justice Yokoi argued that any imbalance worse than

two to one should not be permitted. 37 Minsh5 at 1289 (Yokoi, J., dissenting). Also, Justice Dand6 said
he had full respect for Justice Yokoi's view. Id. at 1270 (Dand6, J., dissenting). In Kawabara, Justices
Sonobe, Sat6, and Kizaki argued for a two to one standard. 47 Minshfl at 93 (Sonobe, J., concurring); Id
at 11-12 (Sat6, J., dissenting)(constitutional duty to make imbalance as close to zero as possible, but
perfect equality impossible); Id. at 116 (Kizaki, J., dissenting). Justice Hashimoto argued that any ratio
over two to one strongly implied unconstitutionality. Id at 99 (Hashimoto, J., dissenting).
15
For example, Ashibe says that a ratio of more than two to one should not be allowed, no matter
how much consideration were given to non-population factors. Ashibe, supra note 133, at 43. Any
migration between the time of census and election and any consideration of geographic boundaries or
traditional political subdivisions in districting and apportionment inevitably results in some distortion. So
while one person, one vote, is the ideal, two, or less-than-two, to one is generally considered a reasonable
approximation.
159
Although there is no doctrine of stare decisis in Japan, precedent is usually followed. "[C]ourts
on all levels follow their own decisions in Japan and overrule their own prior [sic] precedents only for
strong reasons and with reluctance." John Owen Haley et al., Law and the Legal Process in Japan:
Materialsfor an Introductory Course on JapaneseLaw, Part II (Seattle: University of Washington School
of Law, 1994 ed.), at 75-78, in LAW AND INVESTMENT IN JAPAN: CASES AND MATERIALS 49 (Yukio
Yanagida et al. eds., 1994).
160
Indeed, while homing in on three to one, the Court studiously refused to say it had a specific
ratio in mind. Thus, for example, we find the plea in Kawabara that the Court make its implied three to
one ratio explicit. 47 Minshii at 107 (Nakajima, J., dissenting). Justice Nakajima complained that avoiding
a clear statement of the ratio was unacceptable, for it opened the Court to the criticism of inconsistency. Id.
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for "extreme inequality."''
In theory, therefore, a tightening of the ratio
does not involve overturning a precedent. In any case, the Supreme Court
meeting en banc has the explicit authority to overrule its own precedents. 162
Should support for a two to one standard command a majority, the Court
has the ability to significantly increase its protection of the equality rights of
63
the Japanese voter.1
The Japanese Supreme Court has been called the "yes, but" court:
"Yes the apportionment is unconstitutional, but we will [do nothing] about
it. '' 164
Certainly the frustration of dissenting justices and plaintiffs is
palpable. 165 However, the conclusion that the Court has little persuasive
power or has done nothing to remedy the problem would be incorrect. As
the following chart shows, the extent of revision, even if belated,
demonstrates that the Court has clearly affected the Diet's actions.

161
Nevertheless, the Court was clearly converging in these decisions on an imbalance of three to
one as the boundary between constitutionally allowed and disallowed imbalances. See supra chart
accompanying notes 87-91.
162
The Japanese Supreme Court has fifteen justices, including the Chief Justice. The
Court
meeting en banc is referred to as the Grand Bench; the three panels of five justices each are called Petty
Benches. The Grand Bench decides matters of greatest importance, including situations where a precedent
may be overruled. TANAKA, supra note 76, at 48, 59. See also Saibanshohd [Court Organization Law], §§
5(1) and (3), 10(i-iii) (Law No. 59, 1947).
163 See supra note 158.
16
Frank K. Upham, Comment, 53 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 126 (Spring 1990) (emphasis
added).
165
See, e.g., 47 Minshii at 120 (Kizaki, J., dissenting)(based on two to one standard,
an
unconstitutional condition had already been reached at 1960 census) and 39 MinshOi at 1135 (Appellant's
brief)(Court's repetitive use ofjy6hanketsu is just a ratification of the Diet's negligence).
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Imbalance in Vote Value and Election Law Revisions
House of Representatives
Date
4/50
10/60
7/64
10/65
12/72
7/75
10/75
6/80
10/80
12/83
10/85
5/86
7/86
2/90
9/90
10/90
1992
1994

Occasion
Election Law
Census
Law revised
Census
Election
Law revised
Census
Election
Census
Election
Census
Law revised
Election
Election
Election
Census
Law revised
Law revised

Based On
1946 Census
1960 Census
1960 Census
1965 Census
No. of Voters
1970 Census
1975 Census
No. of Voters
1980 Census
No. of Voters
1985 Census
1985 Census
No. of Voters
No. of Voters
No. of Voters
1990 Census
1990 Census

Ratio X: 1
1.51166

3.21
2.19167
3.22168

4.99169

2.92
3.71
3.94
4.54
4.40
5.12
2.99
2.92
3.18
3.34
3.38170
-2.8171
2.137 172

This table reveals two remarkable facts. First, for most of the period
represented, the imbalance ratio has exceeded three to one. Second, each
time the Diet has revised the Election Law to reapportion the House of

M
167

Miyakawa, 42 MinshOi at 665 (Shimatani, J., concurring).
47 Minshii at 120 (Kizaki, J., dissenting).

168

42 MinshO at 668 (Okuno, J., dissenting).

169

Kurokawa, 30 Minshfi at 241.
Information for July 1975 to October 1990 is from 47 MinshOi at 100 (Hashimoto, J.,

170

dissenting).
Nonaka,supra note 115, at 31.
Reform Hits Final Phase: RedistrictingPlan Keeps Wide Vote Disparities, JAPAN TIMES, Aug.
12, 1994, at 1. See also Vote-value Disparity Persists: New Electoral System Does Little to Alleviate
Problem, JAPAN TIMES, Dec. 30, 1994, at 2 (new system went into effect December 25, 1994, with
disparity at 2.22 to one).
171
17
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Representatives, the vote imbalance has come within the Court's three to
73
one ratio, its outer limit for constitutionality. 1
Indeed, some justices have argued that the primary purpose of
apportionment suits should be to warn the Diet to promptly and earnestly
174
fulfill its Constitutional duty to keep the value of the vote equal.
Certainly the Diet was aware of the Court's view during the past three
revisions, for at the time of the 1986 revision, the Diet announced, "[t]his is
merely] a temporary measure to urgently revise the current apportionment,
which has been ruled unconstitutional. When the 1985 National Census
results are announced, 7 5 the Diet will promptly explore thorough
176

reform."

The fact that the revisions have all resulted in imbalances less than
three to one, but greater than two to one, is not surprising. Redistricting is a
highly political exercise when seats must be taken away from sitting Diet
members. Thus, it is natural that the Diet would usually arrive at solutions
that just barely clear the constitutional hurdle. After all, if the Supreme
Court indicates that any number below a certain ratio is constitutional, a
rational actor would not gratuitously risk her party members' seats (or her
own) in order to achieve a "more constitutional" result. Reducing the
imbalance to just 2.99 to one 177 shows the Diet members' awareness of and
recognition of the role of the Supreme Court.
Given this background, the 1994 revision would appear to be an
anomaly because it significantly improved on the "constitutional
requirement" of three to one. The anomaly is explained by the events of the
immediately preceding years. In 1989, the Liberal Democratic Party
("LDP"), which had ruled Japan for most of the post-war period, lost its
majority in the House of Councillors. 171 In 1993, the LDP lost its control of

173
It would be anachronistic to claim that the Diet knew of the Supreme Court's three to one
standard prior to Koshiyama If in 1983. The standard became relatively clear there because the Court
found that the Election Law revision of 1975 had brought the ratio to a constitutional 2.92 to one, but the
3.94 ofKoshiyama H was found to be at an unconstitutional level. 37 Minshfi 1263-64.
174
See, e.g., Kawabara, 47 MinshOi at 91 (Sonobe, J.,
concurring).
17
Results are usually announced in November of the year following the census. Telephone
Interview with T6ru Shind6, Population Census Division, Management and Coordination Agency (Jan. 15,
1997).
176
Quoted in Kawabara, 47 MinshOi at 109 (Nakajima, J., dissenting). Justice Nakajima expressed
his displeasure that the Diet actually did nothing, much less "prompt, thorough" reform, after the Census
was announced. Id.
17
As in 1986. See suprachart accompanying note 170.
179
Raymond V. Christiansen, ElectoralReform in Japan,34 ASIAN SURV. 589, 590 (1994).
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The resulting need for political
the House of Representatives.17 9
realignment and the public clamor for real electoral reform after many years
of scandals and corruption, 180 forced the Diet to pass more rigorous changes
to the Election Law. 8' The LDP, whose policies had brought Japan everincreasing economic success out of the ashes of war, had finally lost power.
The biased election system which had helped maintain this political regime
was no longer acceptable to the Japanese people. 182 Nevertheless, the 1994
revision did not produce a final solution to the imbalance problem. The
imbalance ratio in the local districts is still greater than two to one and the
new ten-year frequency suggested for reapportionment means that
imbalance levels are only likely to worsen.
Reject the ReasonablePeriodDoctrine

2.

In addition to adopting a two to one imbalance standard, the Court
should reject the reasonable period doctrine. Apparently derived from the
five-year frequency suggested by the former Election Law, the reasonable
period is a mistake. First, a basic logical flaw in the reasonable period
analysis is that the Court considers an unconstitutional level of imbalance to
be, in effect, not unconstitutional. An unconstitutional imbalance should
trigger invalidation of the apportionment provision. Second, the reasonable
period doctrine gives precedence to a law passed by the Diet over the
equality clause in the Constitution. However, the Constitution is83 manifestly
the supreme law of the land and takes precedence over statutes.
Third, the Court measures the reasonable period from the occurrence84
of the unconstitutional imbalance to the date of the contested election.'
Although this may be consistent with the case and controversy focus on the
contested election, it ignores the law, which suggests revision at specified
intervals. Certainly the only reasonable period to consider should start at

Id at 589.
Id. at 590-91.
The previous system of multiple-seat districts was scrapped in favor of single-seat districts for
300 of the 500 seats. The remaining 200 seats are elected by proportional representation from eleven large
regional districts. Kdshoku senkyoho, § 4(1).
182 See Obituary: Shin Kanemaru, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996, at 95, for a summary of the misdeeds
179

[so
Is)

and downfall of the LDP and its "kingmaker" Shin Kanemaru.
183 KENP6, art. 98. See supranote 152 and accompanying text.
19
See supra text accompanying note 93.

PACIFIC RIM LAW.& POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 6, No. I

the time of the previous apportionment.'
However, particularly with the
change to revision suggested at ten-year intervals, 1 6 completely abandoning
the reasonable period doctrine would be the better course.' 87

If the

imbalance is unconstitutional, the Court should simply declare it so.
Although the Court could easily move away from this Court-created
doctrine, its continued stress on deference to the legislature suggests that the

reasonable period doctrine will not be completely abandoned soon.
3.

Expedite MalapportionmentCases

The Japanese courts take an unconscionable amount of time to decide
these cases. 88 Since Kurokawa, the analyses in the majority opinions have
been devoid of new thought. Most merely parrot the set phrases of prior
decisions,8 9 and absent a special case, even a junior law clerk (and Japanese
law clerks at the Supreme Court level are seasoned, senior judges) 9 ' could
prepare an opinion in no time at all. 9 ' The Kawabara decision in 1990

came down two years and eleven months after the election.

92

This is

unreasonably long in the context of well-settled doctrine, virtually identical
facts, and a dire constitutional need for quick action. Accelerated Court
declarations of unconstitutionality would spur earlier action by the Diet,
185
The original Schedule I of the Election Law simply suggested revision every five years, not
five
years after some event. Were this done faithfully, there would be no need to search for an event from
which to count the time. To give the Diet five years from the point of unconstitutionality is simply
deference gone mad.
16
Per the new Schedule 1I of Klshoku senkyohd
187
Another practical effect of the reasonable period doctrine is that it takes the pressure off
ameliorative action by the Diet. For example, in Kawabara, the Court found an unconstitutional imbalance
of 3.18 to one to be within the reasonable period, so the provision was not ruled unconstitutional. 47
Minshfi at 87-88.
Mt The time elapsed in the courts until the Supreme Court speaks is very easy to calculate
because
the suits must be filed within 30 days after the election per section 204 of the Election Law. Kishoku
senkyoh6 § 204.
139
Every case post Kurokawa, for example, mentions that case and quotes liberally from it, often
repeating doctrinal arguments verbatim, but without point cites, as is the custom. See, e.g., Kawabara, 47
Minshfi at 83 (reasoning section starts by saying that the basic thinking of the case follows that of
Kurokawa, Koshiyama If, and Kanao, "that there is no reason to change it, [and the] content of those
decisions follows.").
190 TANAKA, supra note 76, at 48, 693.
191
Substitute the new imbalance number from the best- and worst-represented districts and the
decision virtually writes itself.
192
A proposal to require lawsuits under section 204 of the Election Law to be decided in
one
hundred days did not make it into the 1994 Election Law reform. NIHON SHAKAITO SENKYO TAISAKU
IINKAI [JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY ELECTION COMMITTEE], YOKU WAKARU SHIN-SENKYO SEIDO Q & A
[UNDERSTANDING THE NEW ELECTION LAW: Q & A] 58 (1994).
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shortening the time during which citizens' constitutional rights are violated.
Furthermore, Court action within a few months would increase the
possibility of election invalidation. Only the desire of the Court to be
deferential to the Diet stands in the way of expediting the process.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court should reconsider the impact of its decisions on
malapportionment. The Diet has, in fact, respected the Court's declarations
of unconstitutionality;' 93 even though the Diet's action has seldom been fast
or thorough, it has followed the Court's rulings.' 94 The Court can accelerate
the pace of reform by expediting malapportionment cases through the court
system.
Every legislative revision has respected the Court's three to one ratio
by coming in below it-even if just barely below it.' 95 A two to one
standard, zealously protected by the Court, will give Japanese voters a more
equal voice in running their government. 96 Under that standard, if the price
193
Remarkably, in 1994, the Diet revised the apportionment of the House of Councillors after a
High Court decision but before the Supreme Court had decided the case. The Osaka High Court, in a
malapportionment suit with an imbalance of 6.59 to one had held that an imbalance over three to one was
suspect and that over six to one certainly was at an unconstitutional level. Tanoue, 838 HANREI TAIMUZU
at 86, 92. In coming to a jij5 hanketsu decision, the court indirectly scolded the Supreme Court for not
finding prior House of Councillors' imbalances over five to one unconstitutional, thus foregoing the
opportunity to exhort the Diet to reform the apportionment. Id at 93. This was the first time in any court
that a House of Councillors' election had been held illegal. NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, JINKEN TO KENPO SOSJO
[CIVIL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION] 274 (1994). This case was decided by the Grand Bench of
the Supreme Court on September I1, 1996. The court ruled that the 6.59 to one imbalance had reached an
unconstitutional level, but that the "reasonable period" for revision by the Diet had not been exceeded.
Hence, the election was not held to be unconstitutional. This conclusion overruled the Osaka High Court
and affirmed the decision of the Tokyo High Court in a set of companion cases. All fifteen justices
supported the finding of the "unconstitutional level," but the majority decision refusing a final declaration
of unconstitutionality for the imbalance garnered only eight votes. Seven of the justices dissented saying
that the "reasonable period" had long passed. Kakusa 6.59 bai wa ikenjotai, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN,
Sept. 12, 1996, at 35. The Diet reformed the apportionment in June 1994 by taking eight seats from the
best-represented districts, and allocating them to the worst-represented. The imbalance after the reform
was still 4.81 to one. Nonaka, supra note 115, at 31.
194
One could argue that the Diet follows the Court because the standard set is so loose. However,
the Diet seems to have reacted first to declarations of unconstitutionality, then to the specific number. See
supratext accompanying note 176.
195
See supra chart accompanying notes 166-72.
196
Certainly, perfect equality is unattainable if traditional political boundaries are to be respected,
but a two to one standard can accommodate some such factors in the apportionment process. True regional
representation can be accommodated only by constitutional amendment since the equality requirement in
article 14 of the Constitution should tnump any law or regulation that attempts significant non-population
based representation.
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of rice stays at six times the world price, at least it will be a conscious,
deliberate choice of all the people, not just those in favored electoral
districts.'9 7

197
On October 20, 1996, the first House of Representatives election under the new electoral system
was held. WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1996, at A16. Malapportionment is almost certainly to have occurred
again. As shown supra page 24, the vote imbalance was already 2.137 to one at the time of the 1994
revision of the Election Law. If the past is any guide, new law suits will be brought and the Supreme Court
will once again have the opportunity to implement the faster action, more equal ratios, and other steps
recommended here.

